A U.S.-China war over Taiwan would be catastrophic for all sides and the world. Preventing such a war requires understanding how it might unfold—from start to finish—including worst-case scenarios.

How much warning would there be? Where might China strike first? Which countries join the fight? Can Taiwan defend its coasts? Would nuclear threats determine the outcome?

Charles Hooper is a retired U.S. general who served as one of the Pentagon’s top China strategists and spent years living in the country. He joined Jon Bateman on The World Unpacked to give a step-by-step scenario for the war that no one wants.

Transcript

Note: this is an AI-generated transcript and may contain errors

Jon Bateman: This is a time of great disruption. Everyone knows that. Wars, economic crises, AI. But there's another danger, a nightmare scenario that could dwarf all of this. A U.S.-China war. It would upend the global order overnight, tank everyone's economies, and cause mass death on all sides. Now, it's not imminent, maybe not even likely, but the possibility... The mere shadow of this war is already driving huge military buildups and rewiring supply chains and alliances right now. I wanted to peer into this shadow to understand exactly how a U.S.-China war might unfold. So I turned to Charles Hooper, a retired three-star general who not only served as one of the Pentagon's top China strategists, but also spent years living in China. Talking to senior PLA leaders in their own language. Hoop drew on his insider knowledge of both militaries to walk me through hour by hour, decision by decision, a full crisis scenario from cyber-attacks to a nuclear exchange. He told me a lot of things I'd never heard of before about the importance of tides and weather, about the eye-popping damage even the smallest US-China war might cause. And about why nukes might not be a trump card after all. I'm John Bateman, and this is The World Unpacked.

Jon Bateman: General Charles Hooper, Hoop, if I may call you that, welcome to The World Unpacked.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: Glad to be here, thank you so much for having me.

Jon Bateman: We're gonna nerd out today on all the military scenarios that could arise in a potential China, Taiwan, U.S. Conflict, the alliance dynamics, the capabilities, the capacities. Before we get into all of that though, Hoop, I'd love if you could just tell the audience a little bit about who you are. I imagine there are not many people in the U. S. Army who rise to three-star status while also being Mandarin speakers and having lived in China for several years. So how did this happen?

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: Wow, well, thanks. I'll tell you, it's an interesting story. And I went to the United States Military Academy at West Point with every intention of being an engineer. And so every West Point cadet was required to take two years of language. We stood in line right before the academic year began and we gave our choice to an upperclassman what language we wanted. And we were standing there at attention. And when it came my turn, he said, “What language, mister?” And I said “sir, French.” And he said, “French is full pick another language.” So, you know, I learned the first lesson of adulthood, which is you got to have a plan B. I didn't, I didn't have one. Um, and so I looked at the list and Chinese seemed pretty interesting. And in those days, West Point was one of the few universities in the country where you could study Chinese language for four years. I mean, this is, you remember this is 75, so this is only three years after Nixon had gone to China and we had this Chinese language program. So, you know, I selected it. There was some, there were some, perception among some of, my fellow cadets and the senior cadets that I had made an horrible choice and that I was going to flunk out of it and, and that just, that just doubled and tripled my determination to succeed. So long story short, at the end of two years, I was not developing well. My engineering potential was not revealing itself. Let me put it that way um, but the very first A grade that I got at West Point, the very first A I received was in a course called politics and government in China. I took four years of Chinese language at the military academy, and then I went through the early part of my career as an infantryman and enjoyed that but I was selected in the early 80s for a program to train China specialists in the United States Army and entered that in the early to mid 80s and just never looked back. And that led me to, you know, three tours in China, culminating in being the defense attaché, senior director for China policy in the office of the Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon, Deputy Director of strategy at Indo-Pacific command. And on and on and led to almost at this point, a lifelong study of China and US-China relations.

Jon Bateman: Well, you made a wise bet because, as we'll discuss, China poses some of the most wicked and important military challenges the United States faces. I'd love if you could give us a taste of what it is like serving as a U.S. Military officer in China. I mean, you took a course at West Point on the politics and government of China, and then you're actually on the ground interfacing with the politicians and governmental employees of China. What were you doing there and what did you take from that experience?

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: I was very fortunate in a sense to be a military attaché during the height of our policy of engagement. Call that from the mid-80s, okay, 85, 86, and then, you know, there was the interruption of the Tiananmen incident in 1989 but then extending into the 90s and into the early 2000s, where we, from a military-to-military perspective, we were pursuing having engagements with the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Exchanging delegations back and forth in a number of areas, education, medicine, and some other things.

Jon Bateman: And what was the point of that for someone who's not that familiar with the concept of military-to-military engagement, particularly with a potential adversary, what's the logic behind that kind of relationship?

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: Well, I think the logic behind engagement was that it would increase mutual understanding, it would reduce mutual frictions and suspicions, and as a result, reduce the probability of armed conflict because at least we get to know, and at the very least, both sides, the military entities would have an opportunity to clearly express and exchange their relative views on the security situation in East Asia, Taiwan Straits. Those types of things with an eye towards at least understanding our respective positions.

Jon Bateman: And even today, I believe we still have a military attaché in China, and they have one here, if I'm not mistaken.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: We do, they have one here. They have a military office here in Washington DC at their embassy. We have one there in Beijing. But I would say I think the situation has fundamentally changed since those days of engagement. There's much less contact now between the respective attaches and the military institutions in this country. And that's come about as a result of our change in attitude towards China and seeing China more as a strategic competitor. Then as a partner to engage with.

Jon Bateman: Yeah, so we're about to get into all of the complexities of the military scenarios if there ever were to be direct or indirect armed conflict between our two countries. But just sticking for a moment on this experience that you had actually interfacing with the Chinese military, was there something about the texture or the feel of the types of people their psychology their training their culture, that you think could become important for this whole conversation?

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: Absolutely, it absolutely is. And I think at the end of the day, you can discuss military capabilities, you can discuss technology, but it all comes down to how they make decisions and what motivates them to make the decisions. We were in a situation where we were at a banquet and we were discussing as we normally did, transparency with the Chinese military, the fact that it's a very secretive military, the culture is very secret of writ large, But, the Chinese military in particular, they conceal a great deal of their capabilities and their intentions. And we had discussed the fact, consistent with our policy of transparency and our policy engagement, that perhaps they should be more transparent. And I remember the U.S. Official during the gift exchange during the banquet, he had given a gift, it was wrapped in silver paper and he presented the gift to his Chinese counterpart and his Chinese counterpart held up the box and said, you know in reference to the opaque silver wrapping paper this is Chinese transparency and I remember thinking okay and then there was another instance where, even more prophetic where I was sitting with the senior delegation we were we were once again as we always do relating to the Chinese military are policy on Taiwan arms sales and how we were providing defense articles and services to maintain the balance in the streets and this type of thing. And we were interrupted by the senior Chinese official who said, “you can say it in English or Chinese, you can't say it fast or slow. No matter how you say it, you need to understand that we have consistently opposed this policy and we'll always consistently oppose this policy.” And I remember one of the U.S. officials sitting next to me saying, “Are they always this blunt?” I said, “yes, sir, I live here and they're always this blunt.” So those two incidents, I think, kind of frame my approach and shape my approach to dealing with my Chinese counterpart. 

Jon Bateman: It's so interesting because those are little awkward, uncomfortable exchanges, and they're microcosms of the awkward, comfortable strategic dynamic between two countries that seem to have a substantial trade relationship, diplomatic ties, and yet we are staring down the potential possibility of conflict, which you spent your career trying to prepare for and prevent. So let's get into those scenarios now. When people talk about a potential conflict between the U.S. and China inevitably it centers around Taiwan. This autonomous island whose status is disputed, China wants it back. And so typically you'll hear a couple scenarios thrown out. You'll hear an all-out attack scenario where China launches a major amphibious assault on Taiwan. Or sometimes people will talk about a more subtle blockade or so-called quarantine scenario. Is there any particular scenario at the start of a potential conflict that you think is either most likely, most dangerous, keeps you up at night?

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: Well, you know before we get into scenarios, because this is important. I want to outline a couple of things before we get into scenarios, and these are general rules for 21^st century warfare. This will help frame as I give you these scenarios. The first one is, you know, warfare is, not to Clausewitzian, but warfare is politics the application of violence to achieve political and strategic ends. So the scenario that you pick has to align with you economic, strategic, and political objectives. Number two, there are no regional wars in the 21^st century. All wars are global. We see that being played out in Russia-Ukraine and in Iran-U.S. and we’ll get back to that in a minute. Number three, armed conflicts never evolve the way the initiating party anticipates they will. You need to remember these before we talk about scenarios. Number four, the power of asymmetry. 21^st century wars are fought by low-cost drones, saturation strikes, and cheap things. Number four, air power is enabled by soft targets. And we saw that in the Iran conflicts. So in order to have air superiority, if you want to deny someone air superiority, you attack airfields, airplanes, airpeople. Strategic surprise, logistics, and stockpiles decide wars, long or short. If it’s not already in theater for a China-Taiwan conflict it’s not going to have any impact. And lastly, economic chokepoints remain as powerful strategic levers. We see that in the Strait of Hormuz, we would see it in this war. Let's talk about scenarios. What you asked me about. Much of the general discussion about potential U.S.-China scenarios has traditionally focused on an amphibious invasion of Taiwan by China. That said, this is only one of many possible forms this conflict might take. And I would ask our viewers, instead of taking this potential conflict in terms of singular events like an invasion, it might help to think about it in terms of a range of possibilities and activities that are on one end most likely. So in other words, the current non-violent PLA Air Force flights in the Taiwan air defense zone into their airspace, these are most likely scenarios. U.S. freedom of navigation and the Taiwan Straits, most likely, scenarios. For those that are most dangerous and difficult on the other end, and those will be met represented by a full amphibious invasion of Taiwan or the offshore islands. So in between two zones those two extremes are a full range a possible activities, both kinetic and what I mean by kinetic is bombs, rockets, missiles, and troops, and non-kinetic for example cyber-attacks. So, here's some of the scenarios to get to your question. Those scenarios could include a cyber-attack on both civilian and military targets, wipe out, for example, they could decide to wipe out banking information at a main bank. They could decide to wipe out the personnel records of everybody in Taiwan, for example. Or the United States could do that attack on the mainland. They could be deep denial of communications attacks. Most of the communication trunks are going to and coming from Taiwan pass through the mainland. It would be pretty easy to cut them off. You could have anti-satellite attacks, both kinetic, in other words, blowing a satellite out of the sky, and non-kinetic, a cyber attack on a satellite that corrupted its software. You could have maritime blockades of Taiwan or the China coast. You could had maritime quarantines of Taiwan, or the China coast. You could a surgical missile attack targeting leadership, such as we saw in Epic Fury, our attack on the Iranian leadership. Attacks on military bases belonging to our allies and partners never forget the United States fleet the Air Force and the Marines are all located in Japan. Okay, so if you were a Chinese if you are a Chinese military strategist you would think you might want to attack our forces in Japan, which of course brings Japan into the war. We could shoot down, they could shoot one of our surveillance aircraft and finally seizures of an offshore islands. So those are some of the scenarios that could possibly take place here in a US, Taiwan, China conflict scenario.

Jon Bateman: It's dizzyingly complex, and I don't envy the US military planners that have to consider all of these possible scenarios. If we could focus for a moment on some of the kinetic contingencies the bombs, the missiles, a potential amphibious assault. What kind of warning would the Taiwanese, the Americans, the world get in advance of a major Chinese incursion? Would we see a slow, obvious buildup of forces, or would China somehow be able to seize the element of surprise?

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: Okay, and that's a really good question. And I would tell you that most observers such as myself and others have argued that while an amphibious invasion is without question the most dangerous scenario, due to its complexity, it is perhaps the least likely scenario for a Taiwan conflict. No country has executed a large scale amphibius invasion since the United States landings at Incheon, Korea in 1950. I mean, think about that. Think about that during the Gulf, all the wars we've had since when has been the last large-scale amphibious invasion, nineteen fifty. A PSC invasion of Taiwan would be an enormously complex operation with no guarantee for success. They’d have a hard time trying to conceal this from everyone because at the end of the day that half the mass forces somewhere along the China coast to pre-stage them for this amphibious operation. They'd have to load them onto ships at some point. And I would argue it's quite likely they would make no intention of hiding this because the appearance and preparation for an invasion serves as a signal to others of your intent, okay? So, there's always the possibility they might want us to see it. But even if they didn't want us to see, it would be very difficult to hide. Things to remember now, all countries are running a strategic asset that track what other countries do. There is still an element of strategic surprise that exist. Here and I as an example, I'd cite the fact that our current conflict with Iran started during our negotiations. Okay, and there are many that we know that the Chinese have taken note of this and noted that negotiations can be used to mask strategic surprise. So there is still an element of strategic surprise, but I would argue that in this invasion scenario it would be very difficult for the Chinese to hide their intention to mount a large amphibious invasion.

Jon Bateman: Yeah. So we could imagine maybe the PLA amassing all of these forces. And so it's clearer and clearer that the threat now is looming. Maybe that could be used as a coercive instrument, but maybe China might want to not make it clear precisely when or under what circumstances it might want to attack in order to keep the other side off balance. So let's say you're the Taiwanese in that scenario, uh, or the Americans or others, how do you prepare? In this moment of looming threat, are there actions that you would then want to take? I mean, people talk about mining the strait. That itself is kind of pulling the trigger on something. It could be its own sort of provocation or cost. So are there dilemmas that the Taiwanese, the Americans, others in the region might be facing once it became obvious this threat is present as to how aggressively they then prepare in this movement of crisis?

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: Well, and that's very good. And in answer to that, I would say, again, this is not going to develop spontaneously overnight. There is going to be a gradual increase in in tensions across the region, which will give indications that Taiwan, and others by the way, should start preparing for a conflict. Now, one of the things we've learned from the Russia-Ukraine conflict is, and one of things I think the Taiwan have learned from the Russian-Ukraine conflict is that a well-prepared and well-motivated smaller country that prepares defenses can at worst, discourage the efforts of a larger, better equipped country invasion or aggressive at efforts, and at best perhaps defeat it. So I would say that the rising tensions would give sufficient time and warning for Taiwan to start preparing defensive preparing this defensive positions, preparing a layered defense you know the so-called porcupine defense that would at very best disrupt and complicate Chinese strategic intent and operational intent to take the island by force. And that would include integrated air and many of the things that are included in the Taiwan arms sales packages integrated air missile defense anti-tank defense it could include mining the straits and as we know the straits of the Strait of Taiwan is only conducive to an invasion force maybe once or twice a year. Okay, this is not Normandy. This is not the Straits of Normandy.

Jon Bateman: So why is that explained? Is this a weather issue?

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: It's a tides issue and a weather issue that makes it only conducive to an amphibious invasion a few times a year. And oh, by the way, if you recall those of you who have ever been to Taiwan, this is not Normandy. So there's not sloping beaches for people to establish a beach head on. There's rocks and then there's cliffs, okay, on the western side of that island and for that matter on the eastern side. And a mountain range that runs down the middle of the island. So, a properly prepared defense could frustrate and complicate the calculus of an invading force. And given time to prepare for it, it would certainly reduce the probability of short-term success of an invasion force. And I use my words carefully here, because the longer this conflict goes on, the worse it is for all the combatants, but particularly China. Okay, because there's simultaneously a lot of other things are going to be going on here during this conflict that are going to complicate China's efforts to continue a sustained operation against Taiwan.

Jon Bateman: You're listening to The World Unpacked with John Bateman, where we dive deep into pressing global issues and make sense of the big forces shaping our world. Now, have you learned anything so far that intrigued or surprised you? Let me know in the comments, or just give us a like. And if you wanna hear more of my conversations with the world's most informed and interesting people, you can subscribe right here. Now, back to the show. Now, if you're the Taiwanese government, I think particularly for the American government, in this kind of lead up or crisis moment, I wonder how you would balance between two impulses. On the one hand, you want to prepare for a potential attack. On the other hand, you want to dissuade the attack, right? And so I could picture, for example, people in Washington in particular, there would be arguments for prepositioning more U.S. Military assets, pushing them forward toward Guam, toward Japan, in the Philippines elsewhere. And then someone would come back and say well, that could be provocative. That could actually invite the very thing that we want to avoid. How would that debate play out at this moment of confusion?

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: Well, I mean, obviously you can play on anyone a number of ways, but what I would say is, in the case of many of our allies and partners, you know, remember, we only have seven bilateral defense treaties in the world. Five of those seven are in the Indo-Pacific. So, we have obligations to defend South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia. Now, three of those, South Korea, Japan and, the Philippines might be involved in one way or another in a potential U.S.-Taiwan scenario. So, providing articles and services to defend and all three of these countries have territorial disputes with China, if you recall, in terms of small islands, whether it's the Senkakus and others. So are providing, and we have troops in, well, we have troops in two of the three and we a very close rotational relationship with the Philippines. We have troops, of course, in Korea. We have troops in Japan. So, bolstering our troops in Japan, Korea and the Philippines we could go about that and justify that by saying that we're providing and having normal relations with our bilateral treaty allies in terms of the Taiwan relations act of course it becomes much more problematic, but the act calls for us to provide defense articles and services to Taiwan which we would be doing in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, the six assurances and the other guarantees that we've given Taiwan. So yes, I mean, anything could be construed as provocative depending on the perceptions of the receptor of the information. Having said that, there are perfectly legal justifications for us providing defense articles and services and stockpiling equipment in these countries if for no other reason than to fulfill the obligations of our bilateral commitments to those three countries in particular.

Jon Bateman: Mm-hmm. You mentioned before that China itself would face a pretty important decision at the outset of any move against Taiwan, which is whether to go ahead and preemptively strike U.S. Forces in the region, including U. S. Forces in allied territory. It seems like a bit of a dilemma. If you don't do it as the Chinese, you leave those forces there to quickly respond to what you're doing. If you do do it, you directly bring those countries into the fight. How do you see this factor?

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: Well, this goes back to our initial discussion about most likely scenarios and most dangerous scenarios. So clearly, a scenario that involves a direct response by U.S. Forces, for example, an invasion of someone else's territory is likely going to involve some neutralization of the existing U.S. Forces in theater. And the existing, not only the US forces, because remember modern warfare is decided by as much by logistics and supply chains as it is by conflict. So, this is the calculus that the Chinese would have to calculate whether or not, because ideally, they would like to separate US allies from the United States on this issue. They'd like their, they'd like the Asian Pacific nations to decide for want of a more elegant phrase to sit this out. Okay, and not to jeopardize their long-term relations with China, but this therein lies the dilemma. The higher the danger of the scenario, the higher the risk of the scenario the more likely it will involve the bilateral treaty allies in East Asia of the United States, which means a regional conflict which could quickly go global. So in answer to your question, it would come down obviously to a cost benefit analysis, but I would argue that in order for them to make a decision to involve, for example, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, they would have to have a high probability that they could achieve a victory, whatever victory means in the 21st century, presumably seize control of the island or capitulation of the Taiwan government and their acquiescence to whatever conditions China may ask them to or demand that they adopt. They would have to calculate that they could do that very quickly, end the conflict, and try to repair their relations with their allies and partners.

Jon Bateman: Yeah, no. In other words, any amphibious assault on Taiwan would be a huge gamble. But also as part of such an operation, there are moments along the way in which China can increase the stakes of its gamble. It can push more chips on the table by directly going after US and allied forces and infrastructure in an attempt to get a quick win. But then that increases the danger for China. In terms of when we talk about allies, I assume Japan South Korea, they've got some military forces to bring to bear, but a huge part of what they're offering is access to territory, airfields, the legal right that the US would have to use bases in those jurisdictions for American operations. People often point to Japan in particular as just a huge fulcrum. I wonder how you think the Japanese government. Would calculate the costs and benefits of its own involvement in various types of Taiwan contingencies.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: Well, listen, I mean, the Japanese government is going to have to consider the fact that long after this conflict is concluded, geography matters and geography doesn't change, okay? Japan will still be off the coast of China now, pre-conflict and post-conflict. So they're going to take into consideration the potential damage to their own people and their own infrastructure. They're going to have to take into account whatever happens post-bellum after the conflict. And here I would interject. One of the flaws I think in some of our thinking is this issue of, you know people talk about, this conflict would be fought and then we would return to the status quo. There is no returning to the status quo. Just like you can never step in the same flowing river twice, whatever conditions are created after this conflict they might be similar in a sense to conditions prior to the conflict but they won’t be identical and the world will be irrevocably and irreparably changed after that. So, they're going to have to live in that world with the Chinese and move forward as a member of the region with and who knows what the relationship with the United States will look like in the aftermath of this conflict. Again, we have to get away from this lazy thinking about return to the status quo, which helps us to avoid thinking about the changes in relationships that could take place as a result of this conflict. So, I think all of those factors would go into a Japanese calculation of whether or not, but I would say though, it seems almost self evident that because our forward base forces are in Japan, because the American way of war entails us building up combat power at lodgments and areas before we unleash it on our enemies, and the fact that the Chinese have known this for the past seventy or eighty years and have studied this carefully, one would come to the conclusion that Japan may not have a lot of cards to play in this. Because obviously if the Japanese, for example, made a calculated decision to deny us access overflight or deny us the ability to launch operations from their territory, it would have enormous ramifications on the ability of the United States to respond to this contingency. And I would remind all of our viewers that the distance from San Diego to Taipei is 6,896 miles, okay? From Pearl Harbor to Taipei is 5,042 miles. That would mean, what that means is we would have to move people, equipment, aircraft carriers for about 7,000 miles, 14,000 miles both ways in order to get it into theater if we can't stage it from one of our allies and partners in the region.

Jon Bateman: Yeah. Yeah. So it would be almost impossible for the U.S. To put up a serious fight in the strait over any period of time without access to allied territory and particularly Japan. I hear you saying that Japan would face a dilemma about its participation, but that ultimately it would probably feel more pressure to allow U. S. Participation than to deny it. This I guess I guess my question is You mentioned the tyranny of geography here. How close, among other things, China is very close to Taiwan. I think it's like 160 kilometers, something like that. So, there is a fair amount of warning that one might get about the military buildup. But as far as the actual go order, once that order goes off in China, whatever it's sending across the strait, I mean, are we talking... Hours maybe? How quickly would the US, Taiwan, and the whole coalition that it might or might not have face the decision about how hard to go in and immediately start striking these forces?

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: Once there is an indication, however it is received, that an invasion is imminent, the Chinese have an imperative to go as quickly as they possibly can. Why? Because they have all of these troops massed in these locations. So, they'll have them all collected in one group. That, I mean, that forms a pretty lucrative target, even for Taiwan, okay, who as you acknowledge, they're only about 100 miles away. And so, if it is determined that this invasion is imminent, why wouldn't those who were defending themselves take every measure to disrupt the assembly of troops, to disrupt assembly of ships that is coming together to format this? So, in answer to your question, the Chinese would have to decide and decide quickly to move this. So, we would be talking about, you know, I mean, hours once it was decided, because once it's revealed, they have to move quickly to get the troops where they need to be. They have this have to establish a beachhead before, for example, the United States can begin to mobilize its forces. Speed is of the essence here. And let's not forget that this is, as you alluded to, a home game for the Chinese. It is an away game for us. The entire underlying principle of the Chinese defense buildup based on anti-access area denial. I mean. We say that so often, I don't think sometimes we really think about what we're saying. Anti-access area denial. Denying who? Denying the United States access to the area. So that they cannot build up and sustain combat power. So the entire Chinese defensive buildup has been predicated on denying us the ability to concentrate our forces and to oppose them in this, if they allow us the time to do so, the probability of success for them starts to diminish. So they have to move quickly.

Jon Bateman: Time is punishing for all sides, but in different ways. As you say, for the whole strategy to succeed, China has to move as quickly as possible. But on the other hand, if you're an American president, is this such an anguished decision as to whether to put US troops and prestige on the line to defend Taiwan, you're not gonna have to wanna make that decision quickly, but you will have to. And then on the Taiwanese side, It may seem obvious that they would want to strike as quickly as possible in order to slow down the Chinese, but could it depend on the political conditions inside Taiwan? There are two parties in Taiwan. The DPP, which is kind of more pro-Taiwanese autonomy, a bit harder line, the KMT, which is seen as more accommodating to China, might want to negotiate in these situations, pursues de-escalatory paths. Could you envision a debate within Taipei itself? Even as these forces were massing about, you know, should we really strike or fight or should we should we try to kind of bide our time here?

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: Absolutely. Again, this is something we don’t think about. We tend to think about the motivations of these three actors as self-evident. For Taiwan, it’s survival. For the PRC, it’s sovereignty, for the United States it’s credibility. So, for years, we have tended to think that the motivations for these three actors to be self-evident, but I’m not sure they are. Again, the chosen military scenario in this instance all goes back to the strategic and political objectives of the conflict. What is it that you really want to do? And I would cite operation Epic Fury, not to get off track, as an example of that. What were the strategic objectives, regardless of the operational success, you might operational success in a military operation it still might not gain you your strategic objectives. So, for example, in the case of the PRC, if the strategic objective is simply the removal of the Taiwan government, would that necessitate a full amphibious invasion. Or might some other military scenario, a decapitation strike, a quarantine, an economic embargo, might that result in the same outcome? What would be the goals and objectives of Taiwan? We tend to assume its sovereignty. Might it not be survivability under any conditions? Bloomberg estimates that a full-scale U.S.-China-Taiwan conflict would cost approximately 10 trillion with the T dollars, which is equivalent to 10% of the global GDP. Taiwan's GDP would drop by 40%. China's GDP would drop by about 17%. The GDP of the United States would drop by 6.7%, but let's go back to Taiwan. It's extraordinary. A 40% drop in GDP. So might Taiwan decide that perhaps sovereignty is not their strategic objective, maybe survivability is? Might that change the conditions under which they would defend themselves? Might the Chinese decide that perhaps instead of occupying the island, acquiescence is a sufficient strategic and political goal? And might that dictate what their military operations, military options would be? And I'll stop there. To answer your question, we tend to think of this as black and white, black and, white, black and white, but I'm not so sure it is.

Jon Bateman: There's extraordinary economic pain that would be felt around the world. I think just to flush this out for people, regardless of what happened, if there were some kind of kinetic operations in and around Taiwan, that would lead to a freezing of shipping in the region, regardless of any government action, right? Insurers, shippers, they just wouldn't want to take the risk. And these are very strategic. Straits where a lot of economic activity for the whole world takes place. And then we would start to see sanctions and retaliation amongst all of these parties. We might see significant declines in trade between the US and China, China and Taiwan, China and Europe, China in Asia. And this is kind of the vital arteries of the global economy. And from a Taiwanese perspective, I mean, my God, 40% reduction in GDP. That's. I think worse than the Great Depression, or at least in that zone. So once a conflict was underway, in some ways, would it be almost like a game of chicken about who was willing to tolerate what kind of pain the longest?

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: [00:33:40] I wouldn't characterize it so much as chicken as it would become an endurance contest actually of who could sustain this. Just to illustrate your point and I've been looking at this very carefully and every time I go to Singapore, I stand on Mount Farber, right? My family's taking snaps of beautiful Singapore. I'm looking down at that harbor and the Straits of Singapore. 20% of all oil transported on this planet goes through the Strait of Hormuz. 30% of all global commerce, all of it, passes through the Straits of Singapore, Sunda and Malacca and the Taiwan Straits from the Indian Ocean into the South China Sea. If there's an armed conflict, all that stops, okay? And I had somebody tell me the other day, well, why don't they just go around? Well, that's not going to happen because remember, if there's an economic, quarantine or blockade of Taiwan, it's going to extend all the way out to the east coast of Taiwan. Making it virtually impossible for global shipping, the volume of global shipping we're talking about to sail around the conflict. And in fact, I would argue, it is to the advantage of the combatants to close it off, to place, to your point, to place pressure on the combatant to cease operations.

Jon Bateman: Yeah. And moreover, you know, if, if we got to a point of like Chinese missiles striking Guam, for example, a US territory that could be a kind of forward operating base, the conflict zone itself would be enormous at that point.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: [00:35:18] Right. I would argue that the minute we strike, for example, the atolls, the fortified atoll's, okay, I would, argue that, and this is based upon my time with the Chinese, that in their minds, we will have struck Chinese sovereign territory. Okay. And so if we have struck, you know, we may not see it that way, but in their eyes, they might have seen us, they might have perceived us as having struck Chinese sovereign territory. And on that basis, the full spectrum of potential responses, symmetric and asymmetric, is open, okay? Including striking U.S. Territory, of which Guam is. Go back to the economic point for a minute. Let's talk about a maritime blockade. A maritime blockage that would last a year, for example. That same Bloomberg study says that the global GDP, just the blockade, would be reduced by five percent, Taiwan's GDP would fall by 12 percent, China's GDP by nine percent, and the United States' GDP by three percent. So just a blockade of, for example, the China coast and Taiwan would result in a precipitous drop in global GDP, just a blockade, just to let you know that it's not just the full-scale war, it's anything even approaching a conflict would have... By making it have an impact on the global GDP, it then becomes a global problem. I remember years ago when talking to one of my European counterparts, I won't say which one, and this was many years ago, late 80s, early 90s, and I remember them telling me that this Taiwan thing, that's what they called it, was not their problem, right? It was a United States problem in their relations with China, okay? And that Taiwan, in other words. A conflict over Taiwan wasn't necessarily a European problem, was what he was trying to tell me. And this was his personal opinion. That is no longer the case. The longer this goes on, it will involve an impact on the European community, Latin America, Africa, everyone. And everyone will have a vested interest in seeing it end as quickly as possible.

Jon Bateman: Yeah, just to draw attention to at least one aspect of this, people may know that Taiwan produces most of the world's advanced semiconductors and many other semiconductors. And this is the lifeblood of the emerging AI economy and of a lot of technology. And so if this were to be damaged, destroyed, or even unable to receive inputs or export outputs to the rest of the world. That would be a significant hit to one of the biggest investment construction booms that's happening in America and globally right now. If I could take us back to this most dangerous scenario of a Chinese assault on the island and you mentioned at one point beachheads that China would be attempting to establish. I guess at that point, we would kind of shift from a air maritime situation into at least in part. Ground combat between Chinese forces and Taiwanese forces. How prepared is Taiwan to defend itself on the ground? What forces does it have to bring to bear, and what are their readiness?

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: Well, I mean, look, they have a very well-established armed force. It's very well equipped. And so they have the end, and even more so, given some of the arms that we are proposing and have already been approved, I know the president and the administration are holding up the arms, the latest arms package at this point. But between the arms they already have, and the arms that have been approved, they have all of the tools necessary to mount a very credible defense. Further, I think that the Taiwan population has been somewhat emboldened by the example set by Ukraine of what is within the realm of possibility in terms of mounting a credible defense against a larger foe. They understand the importance of using, for example, using social media to control the global narrative. And the potential impact that that can have on mobilizing other states to place pressure on China. And they know that the longer they can hold out, the longer that they can defend, and the more probable it is that the Chinese will not achieve their goals. Now, having said that, I'm not sure any of us really know how the Taiwan population and how they would play out. Remember, it was common knowledge and commonly accepted that Ukraine would fold very quickly. And that Ukraine will be subsumed by Russia and it would be a very quick conflict. Now I would tell you the minute I heard President Zelensky say that he didn't want to ride in exile, he wanted more ammo, I kind of figured that we had misread the character. And I've been to Kyiv and I've been to Ukraine during this conflict and seen the resolve in the Ukrainian people. So, I don't think you can ever really judge these things until it actually happens. But I know many of your listeners and myself have spent a lot of time in Taiwan. We know that the character of the Taiwan people is evolving perhaps in a different direction than the mainland as a sense of identity. And it's quite possible that they could take advantage of the arc in evolution, I would say that, you know, we say the nature of warfare never changes, but the character warfare is constantly evolving. And we're seeing it evolve in a direction where the defense is a bit more powerful than the offense, you know? So for example, in the case of Iran, Iran has been able to absorb the enormous advantage that the United States has and still survive. And so there are numerous examples in the 21st century where nations were able to confront aggressors in this case, better equipped, more high technology and better equipped aggressors and able to survive. So, in answer to your question, I think the tools are all there for Taiwan to resist. They certainly had enough time to prepare. It's not as if this is something new that's developed. We've been preparing for this for almost 80 years. So, they know what's coming. So, I think they have as good a chance of resisting this and complicating the calculus of the mainland China as anybody.

Jon Bateman: It's such a conundrum for any decision-maker or outside observer looking at this hotspot to know that one of the biggest factors that would drive any outcome in a military scenario is just this kind of psychosocial, political sort of, what is the character of the Taiwanese people? What kind of will do they summon in this scenario? And for the same part, that the Chinese people, the American people, these kind of unknowable factors, again, it gets to the question of To some degree, China taking this leap would be a gamble. They would be betting on their belief of the Taiwanese character, their will. Putin made that bet. He got it wrong. We don't know whether Xi Jinping has the type of intelligence service or political decision-making structure to get that question right, or if anyone could know.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: The issue is not so much whether they get it right or not, the issue is whether they're willing to listen, to listen to evidence and a point of view that perhaps may run contrary to their own strongly held perceptions and beliefs. And remember, in the case of China, to a certain extent, the regime has tied its legitimacy and its viability to this particular issue, to certain extent. So not only at stake are the geopolitical risk and state that we would normally associate with this type of conflict. But in the case of China's history and Xi Jinping's own legacy are closely tied to success in this. A failure could quite possibly place the regime at risk, certainly place Xi Jinping at risk, but possibly place the current communist regime in its current state at risk as well so that's a factor as well

Jon Bateman: Yeah, it's interesting. Americans have this experience of these long running kind of creeping wars in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, where we kind of know it's not working, but no one wants to be the person to pull the trigger and leave. I wonder if China could almost have a reverse Vietnam problem with Taiwan, where they kind of see Taiwan slipping away politically, and yet, does any one Chinese leader, in particular Xi Jinping... To be the person to pull the trigger and gamble his regime's legitimacy on the outcome of that operation. It might feel safer not to, and just to sort of see what happens. But of course, we've got to be prepared for any scenario. Just to raise the stakes even further, Hoop, we have not yet talked about, but I think we must now bring into this conversation nuclear weapons. China, of course, is a nuclear power. It's undertaking a massive nuclear buildup, in fact. And one of the things that we have seen in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is, of course, nuclear weapons haven't been used. But the threat of nuclear escalation by Russia, even implicit, has kind of frozen other people's decision-making and paralyzed the American government and others at times. In a crisis or confrontation. A military kinetic conflict or the lead up to one. Could China use nuclear blackmail in the same way that Russia has, and how would we deal with that?

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: Well, I mean, the irony of nuclear blackmail is that if someone calls your bluff and you use it, everybody loses. It's funny, art imitating life. I was talking to a friend of mine about this the other day, and harken back to the old movie “War Games” where they had the kid hack into the computer and the computer runs these endless nuclear scenarios, and comes to the conclusion that the only way to win is to not to play. And I would say the answer to your question is certainly the specter of the use of nuclear weapons always remains. Many countries believe that having a nuclear deterrence places them in a separate category, enhances their deterring capability. We have seen that Pakistan, North Korea, Iran is trying to acquire nuclear weapons to enhance its deterring capability, but there is a big difference between having them and using them. One of the most important lessons I learned during my military career, ironically, did not come as a result of armed conflict. It came as a results of being involved in the response to the failure of the nuclear reactor at Fukushima in Japan. It was one of the most eye opening experiences of my military career. Of course I was in the military during Chernobyl, but I was removed from that. But seeing the dilemma of, you know, us intelligently discussing whether or not we wanted to evacuate our forces from Japan. We did evacuate our family members. How do you decontaminate a United States aircraft carrier? At what level do you give a full dose of potassium iodine to a five-year-old child exposed to nuclear, to radiation. So, you know, the watching the complexity of dealing with the failure of a nuclear civilian reactor, brought to the fore the thought that the use of these weapons would have ramifications that no side could control. And if we've learned anything about modern warfare, and I said this in the beginning, it's that it very rarely, if ever, evolves the way the initiator anticipated it would. So, and if anyone is learning any lessons for modern warfare, I hope it's that one, particularly where nuclear weapons are concerned. Now, yes, Putin tried to use the nuclear weapons. He tried to blackmail. Ultimately, he didn't use them. I would argue that to a certain extent, we anticipated that he would not because the ramifications for him are just as severe as the country targeted with the nuclear weapon.

Jon Bateman: Yeah, it's a nightmare scenario. We've been talking about the most dangerous scenario. This is the most dangerous of the most danger. So the most dangerous, it would be a disaster for China and the whole world. But I guess the blackmail theory is that although it would be disastrous, there might be a sense that China cares more or would be more willing to go to the mat. And this did happen in Ukraine. My understanding is, you know, as President famously said, I don't want to start World War III. He seemed to often cite the risk of nuclear escalation as a reason behind more restrained steps that he took rather than providing levels of assistance to Ukraine that he viewed as potentially more escalatory and inviting of nuclear scenarios. I guess I just wonder if this same shadow. Could haunt American decision makers in any kind of Taiwan contingency. That China cares more about Taiwan than we do. Like you said, Hoop, it's kind of key to their national identity and legitimacy. And so as irrational as blackmail could be, maybe they might gamble that we would back down rather than them.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: It's entirely possible that they might gamble that we would back down from a nuclear provocation. But they would also, I would argue they would have to consider that employing a nuclear a nuclear weapon would precipitate an exchange of nuclear weapons that would render the Taiwan issue moot and irrelevant. Okay? Moot and irrelevant. Because whether the attack would be symmetric or asymmetric, again, it would have ramifications far outside whatever the relative target was. And I'm racking my brain right now, thinking for a target, a nuclear target, counter value or counter force target that would not have the inherent risk of a symmetric or asymmetric counter strike that would render, you know you'd forget about you know the old the old joke about you know You forget that your objective was to drain the swamp when you're killing alligators, right? Yeah, all of a sudden it becomes killing a bigger alligator that defends you.

Jon Bateman: Yeah, so the theory is if there's a tit for tat nuclear exchange and China also is hit with American nuclear weapons, the damage to China from that would be more significant than whatever is gained in terms of Taiwanese territory. It gives one shudders to contemplate everything that we've talked about today from a global recession or even depression, all the way up to mass slaughter and potential nuclear war. And yet these scenarios are live enough that at least we need to think about how to prevent them. And of course your career in the US military was in large part built on. Preventing and preparing for these set of contingencies. So maybe that is where we could end. What actions need to be taken now to make sure that these scenarios don't unfold?

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: Listen, I'm a strong believer that, you know, of course we have this strategic competition and the relationship will be defined into the midterm and long-term as one of strategic competition. But competition doesn't necessarily have to mean conflict. Now, it is the job of militaries to prepare for worst case scenarios. That's what they do. And I totally understand that. Having said that, I find it, I've always found it interesting that both countries in terms of considering Taiwan, both countries think time is on their side, okay? It's always been the case. The United States has always felt time is on their because the diversification and the modernization of the Chinese economy would increase the risk to China of initiating a conflict over Taiwan. The Chinese believe that their continued rise, the continued rise of their comprehensive national power, the fact that there's already a great deal of integration between the Taiwan economy and the mainland economy would ultimately result in somewhere way down the line, some type of peaceful accommodation with Taiwan, okay? So, both sides feel that time is on their side. And perhaps, time is on all of our sides with respect to this conflict. And that by maintaining an environment where both sides can continue to evolve and grow, we might see an alternative outcome to this that doesn't involve a conflict that will devastate the entire globe.

Jon Bateman: So in other words, let's just keep kicking the can down the road as far as we can each year without a war is another year in which not only do we not have to experience all of this devastation, but perhaps the conditions to prevent it from ever happening are deepening is that is that basically the whole.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: Well, it is I wouldn't characterize it. You know, we Americans have innumerable sayings that imply negative connotations and our predisposition towards action on everything, you know do something you know, causes us to come up with phrases like ‘kick the can down the road,’ but I would tell you if you would like to characterize kicking the can down the road as shorthand for avoiding a devastating conflict that could result in millions of deaths, and a devastation of an interconnected global economy. I would gladly see the can kick down the road to some time in the future, and place bets on a resolution of this issue that might not be ideal, but certainly will be peaceful.

Jon Bateman: I can't think of a better way to wrap this up. Hoop, very grateful for your time today and expertise.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles "Hoop" Hooper: You're very welcome. It was a pleasure to be here with you.

Jon Bateman: You've been listening to The World Unpacked, a production of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. To get episodes delivered directly to your inbox, use the link in the description, or subscribe on YouTube or popular podcast platforms like Spotify or iTunes. Views expressed are those of the host and guests, and not necessarily those of Carnegie. Learn more at carnegieendowment.org.